Knowledge Security: Enabling Safe and Open International Collaboration

International collaboration in science, technology, and innovation (STI) can raise security and ethical risks. Knowledge security is a new policy concept in scientifically leading, democratic countries that seeks to safeguard scientific values as well as national security and interests by addressing these risks. Many countries, including Switzerland, are currently formulating and implementing knowledge security policies.

The free exchange of ideas leads to scientific discoveries and technological breakthroughs. For this reason, open science, academic mobility, and international cooperation are cornerstones of national STI sectors, which together form an integrated system of exchange. Over the past decades, however, two drivers have emerged to challenge the cornerstones of the global STI sector and put knowledge security on the political agenda.

The first driver of knowledge security relates to rising geopolitical tensions and the ensuing security concerns.1 Because of their broader interpretation of national security, certain autocratic governments have exploited the openness of the global STI sector to further their agendas. Over the past few decades, they have updated their militaries, enhanced their repressive surveillance systems and violated human rights domestically, and spread propaganda and self-censorship abroad.2 This not only contravenes the national interests and security of scientifically leading, democratic countries, but also core scientific values, such as academic freedom and scientific integrity.

The Chinese government, for example, has put in place many policies that seek to acquire critical STI from abroad.3 In 2016, the Chinese government initiated the civil-military fusion strategy, which aims to advance scientific, industrial, and military development concurrently, and encourages Chinese researchers to work on dual-use research.4 In 2021, the government passed two laws – the Data Security Law and the Personal Information Protection Law – that empower Chinese authorities to screen any data leaving China as well as seize any data deemed critical. For several years now, the government has also conducted widespread industrial and academic espionage, as the British, Swiss, and other intelligence agencies report.5

The second driver of knowledge security relates to the compromise of scientific integrity and the ensuing ethical concerns. Collaboration with international partners that are implicated in human rights violations raises complicity concerns for individual researchers and violates their scientific integrity. For the STI sector, this codified set of principles, which emerged following the role researchers had in the development of weapons of mass destruction, ensures the ethical practice and use of research across different value systems.

Time and time again, researchers have flagged collaborations due to ethical concerns. Recently, collaborations with certain Israeli partners have been partly or fully suspended by various science actors on the grounds that researchers in other countries would be complicit in the alleged human rights violations in which the said Israeli partner may be directly or indirectly implicated.6 Collaborations with other international partners have been suspended for similar reasons.

Figure 1: Security and ethics are the two drivers of Knowledge Security. Picture source: Gunnar Ridderström/Unsplash

The two drivers of knowledge security – security and ethics – thus raise multiple risks. Taken together, they challenge core aspects of how the global STI sector is constructed and converge to justify a reappraisal of how international collaboration can and should be conducted. Knowledge security thus represents a conceptual and practical response to this challenge. It seeks to balance openness with safety by protecting core scientific values and assets as well as safeguarding national interests and security.

More specifically, knowledge security addresses four external risks and two internal risks: (1) sensitive knowledge and technology transfer to individuals and organisations involved in human rights violations and foreign military and security apparatuses; (2) infringements to scientific integrity and scientific values; (3) lack of reciprocity, transparency, and compliance between international partners; (4) science monopolies and financial dependencies on international partners; (5) political overreaction to the four external risks that could lead to hard decoupling or discrimination; and (6) lack of a coherent response that could lead to an asymmetrical implementation of policies and the creation of loopholes.7

Since the early 2020s, science and policy actors in Australia, Canada, the EU, EU Member States, Japan, Norway, Taiwan, the UK, and the US have formulated and are currently implementing policies at institutional, national, and international level to tackle these risks. Switzerland is somewhat behind on this, but has also taken action.8 In 2022, swissuniversities, the umbrella organisation of Swiss higher education institutions (HEI), issued a non-mandatory guideline on responsible internationalisation for its members in line with their institutional autonomy. While some HEI have implemented policies, others have not. Yet coherence between institutions and at national level is key to address risks holistically and consistently. Coordination is therefore key.

Throughout 2024, Swiss science and policy actors have sought to align their views on core issues and increased their coordination efforts. It appears possible that two new working groups will be established – one for science actors and one for policy actors – that will develop national criteria to determine which countries, institutions, research areas, and funding sources are deemed sensitive and what national measures should be taken. Although awareness for knowledge security amongst decision-makers in science and policy organisations has clearly risen, awareness among researchers and students remains relatively low.

Lack of awareness, coherence, and implementation of knowledge security measures remain key challenges for Swiss actors. It is to be hoped that recent positive developments will continue in 2025. Meanwhile, the drivers of knowledge security – and their ensuing risks – will not disappear any time soon. Although international collaboration has become a challenge in this new era of strategic competition, knowledge security can navigate the challenges and enable sage and open international collaboration.

 

 

1Leo Eigner, “Knowledge Security at Stake,” CSS Analyses in Security Policy, no. 336 (2024).

2Arena Baykal and Thorsten Brenner, Risky Business: Rethinking Research Cooperation and Exchange with Non-Democracies (Global Public Policy Institute, 2020).

3Rebecca Arcesati, Irène Hors, and Sylvia Schwargg Serger, Sharpening Europe’s approach to engagement with China on science, technology and innovation (MERICS, 2021).

4Alex Joske, Picking flowers, making honey: The Chinese military’s collaboration with foreign universities (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2018).

5Gordon Corera, «MI5 head warns of ‘epic scale’ of Chinese spyingBBC News, October 18, 2023. Sicherheit Schweiz (Nachrichtendienst des Bundes, 2024).

6For example, the University of Ghent in Belgium has suspended collaboration on such grounds.

7Leo Eigner, “Knowledge Security: Ein neues Konzept für die Schweiz,” Bulletin 2024 zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik (Center for Security Studies, 2024), 111-138.

8Ibid, 127-133